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Few interests can be more compelling than a nation’s need to ensure its
own security. It is well to remember that freedom as we know it has been
suppressed in many countries. Unless a society has the capability and will
to defend itself from the aggressions of others, constitutional protections
of any sort have little meaning.2
This practice, [the use of secret evidence,] which was a mainstay of every
tyrannical regime in history and which the United States has consistently
denounced, is now accepted.3
The ability to use secret evidence in trials involving national security matters is
an extremely controversial power of the government lawyer. Although the use of
secret evidence was a divisive issue before September 11, 2001, the terrorist attacks
that day sparked the passage of new legislation that increased the power of the
government lawyer to use classified evidence. By examining the cases involving
secret evidence both before and after September 11, in particular the case of Zacarias
Moussaoui, it becomes apparent that what is at stake is the appropriate balance
1

J.D. Candidate, Harvard Law School; B.A., Williams College, 2001.

2

Kiareldeen v. Ashcroft, 273 F.3d 542, 556 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting Wayte v. United
States, 470 U.S. 598, 611-12 (1985)).
3

Steven W. Becker, “Mirror, Mirror on the Wall . . .”: Assessing the Aftermath of
September 11th, 37 VAL. U.L. REV. 563, 615-16 (2003).
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between national security concerns and the constitutional rights of defendants.
Current legislation gives prosecutors significant authority in determining whether
and how secret evidence will be used and in what forum; it is crucial that
government lawyers use this power with integrity. Only by appropriately balancing
defendants’ rights and national security concerns can justice be done in cases
involving threats to national security.
I. THE USES OF SECRET EVIDENCE
A. The Immigration and Nationality Act
Secret evidence has been used by government lawyers since the 1950’s, when its
use was motivated by fear of the national security threat posed by Communists.4
Enacted in 1952, the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) allows the use of secret
evidence in excluding aliens seeking entry to the United States as well as in
considering applications by aliens for discretionary relief.5 The term “secret
evidence” usually refers to evidence that an immigrant in a deportation or exclusion
proceeding is not allowed to see and the source of which is concealed,6 but its use
has been expanded to criminal cases. Government officials claim that such
anonymity is necessary because without it no one would provide information about
terrorist activities.7 Additionally, in terms of the recent application of secret
evidence, the anonymity of the source of such information protects highly advanced
technical surveillance systems, such as satellite systems, from being compromised by
revelations about the methods of the technology.8
Recently, particularly since the late 1980’s, the Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS) has used secret evidence in detaining and deporting Muslims and
Arabs.9 Whereas in other contexts distinctions made based on national origin or race
would come under heightened judicial scrutiny, the plenary power doctrine allows
Congress to make immigration and deportation decisions on such bases.10 “Because
deportation is deemed not to be punishment, the constitutional protections

4
Ronald Smothers, U.S. Bars or Expels Suspect Immigrants on Secret Evidence, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 15, 1998, at A1.
5
Peter J. Spiro, Globalization and the (Foreign Affairs) Constitution, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 649,
707-08 (2002).
6

Smothers, supra note 4.

7

Id.

8

Id.

9
Natsu Taylor Saito, The Enduring Effect of the Chinese Exclusion Cases: The “Plenary
Power” Justification for On-Going Abuses of Human Rights, 10 ASIAN L.J. 13, 19 (2003)
[hereinafter Saito, Plenary Power]; see also Natsu Taylor Saito, Will Force Trump Legality
After September 11? American Jurisprudence Confronts the Rule of Law, 17 GEO. IMMIGR.
L.J. 1, 37 (2002) [hereinafter Saito, American Jurisprudence].
10

Saito, Plenary Power, supra note 9, at 20.
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guaranteed to all persons in criminal trials do not apply, allowing, among other
things, the use of secret evidence and indefinite incarceration without a hearing.”11
In Rafeedie v. Immigration & Naturalization Service,12 Fouad Rafeedie, a
fourteen-year lawful permanent resident alien, was arrested upon trying to reenter the
United States after a 1986 trip to Syria in which he attended the First Conference of
the Palestine Youth Organization (PYO).13 The INS claimed that the PYO was
affiliated with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), a terrorist
organization.14 Rafeedie denied affiliation with any group engaged in or supporting
terrorism.15 Upon his arrest at the airport, Rafeedie was paroled for deferred
inspection, but was eventually charged, the following year, with being excludable
from the United States.16 During the ensuing summary exclusion proceedings, the
INS relied upon secret evidence, claiming that disclosing the evidence would be
“prejudicial to the public interest, safety, or security of the United States.”17 The
District of Columbia Circuit disallowed the use of such evidence indirectly by
finding that due process was required in the proceedings and by describing the perils
of the use of secret evidence that would presumably endanger Rafeedie’s due process
rights.18 The court reasoned as follows: Rafeedie was a lawful permanent resident
and the secret evidence involved concerned Rafeedie’s activities while in the United
States; further, Rafeedie would have been entitled to due process had he been the
subject of a deportation proceeding while living in the United States.19 Therefore,
due process was required in the exclusion proceedings.20 The court also noted that if
the use of secret evidence was allowed, Rafeedie could “prevail . . . only if he
[could] rebut the undisclosed evidence against him . . . . It is difficult to imagine how
even someone innocent of all wrongdoing could meet such a burden.”21

11

Id. See also Smothers, supra note 4 (explaining that a Justice Department spokesman
has said “that the courts have allowed the use of secret evidence because they consider grants
of political asylum and other efforts for noncitizens as ‘discretionary benefits and
extraordinary acts of sovereign generosity.’”).
12

880 F.2d 506 (D.C. Cir. 1989).

13

Id. at 508-09. In his original application for a reentry permit, Rafeedie claimed that he
was visiting Cyprus to be with his mother, who required major heart surgery, but in truth his
mother lived in Ohio. Id. at 508.
14

Id. at 509.

15

Id.

16

Id.

17

Rafeedie v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 688 F. Supp. 729, 734 (D.D.C. 1988).

18

Rafeedie, 880 F.2d at 523.

19

Id.

20

Id.

21

Id. at 516. For a shorter summary of the case, see Susan M. Akram & Kevin R. Johnson,
“Migration Regulation Goes Local: The Role of States in U.S. Immigration Policy”: Race,
Civil Rights, and Immigration Law After September 11, 2001: The Targeting of Arabs and
Muslims, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 295, 321-22 (2002).
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Controversial secret evidence was used in another case soon after Rafeedie. The
“Iraqi Seven”22 were Iraqi Kurds who “worked for a CIA-funded Iraqi opposition
group.”23 Although the men were evacuated from Iraq to the United States by the
United States government, the INS eventually initiated exclusion proceedings against
them because of alleged visa violations.24 The men were held for a year on the basis
of secret evidence.25 The group sought asylum in the United States, claiming that
they would be persecuted if they returned to Iraq.26 The immigration judge
concluded, mainly on the basis of the secret evidence, that the men were threats to
national security and thus could not remain in the United States.27
Despite the Iraqis’ attorney having the highest security clearance possible, he was
prevented from seeing the evidence.28 During a later stage of the litigation, the INS
declassified most of the material, releasing five hundred pages of the secret evidence
and giving unclassified summaries of the remainder of the evidence.29 At that time it
was revealed that much of the material had been “erroneously classified,” contained
substantial translation errors, and demonstrated “ethnic and religious stereotyping by
the FBI,” and further that some of the information was unreliable, “including rumors
and innuendo.”30 Five of the seven men eventually settled their cases by
“withdrawing their asylum claims in exchange for release from detention.”31
B. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
After the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) and the Illegal Immigration
Reform and Individual Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), which permit the use of secret
evidence in removal proceedings,32 in particular, those resulting from allegations of
terrorism.33 This occurred even though, according to Steven W. Becker, these laws
are “a clear violation of the constitutional right to confront and cross-examine those

22

Some articles describe the group as consisting of six men. See, e.g., Smothers, supra
note 4.
23

Akram & Johnson, supra note 21, at 323-24.

24

Id.

25

Smothers, supra note 4.

26

Akram & Johnson, supra note 21, at 324.

27

Id.

28

Smothers, supra note 4.

29

See id.; Akram & Johnson, supra note 21, at 324.

30

Akram & Johnson, supra note 21, at 324.

31

Id.

32

Id. at 322.

33

Spiro, supra note 5, at 708.
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who proffer charges or testimony against another.”34 Under AEDPA, special courts
called “alien terrorist removal courts” can be created for such cases.35
After the passage of AEDPA, the INS initiated nearly two dozen deportation
actions on the basis of secret evidence that it claimed would threaten national
security if revealed.36 In 1999, “twenty-five secret evidence cases were pending in
the United States”;37 by 2000, new cases involving secret evidence were arising
monthly.38
Examples of cases that occurred in this time period include those of Nasser
Ahmed, Anwar Haddam, Mazen al-Najjar, and Imad Hamad. Beginning in 1996,
Nasser Ahmed, an Egyptian man whose children were United States citizens, was
detained for more than three years, “mostly in solitary confinement,” while he was
the subject of deportation proceedings, during which the INS relied primarily on
secret evidence.39 The INS claimed that Ahmed was a threat to national security
because he was in some way associated with a terrorist organization.40 The INS only
revealed Ahmed’s alleged association after a year of his incarceration and never
specified the group Ahmed was allegedly associated with.41 When the INS
eventually had to disclose the secret evidence, it was revealed that much of the
information upon which the INS had relied was unsubstantiated.42 The district judge
ruled that Ahmed was not a national security threat and ordered that he be released.43
“[I]t turned out that the FBI and INS [had been] attempting to make good on their
threat to deport him for refusing to inform on Sheik Abdel Rahman, who was on trial
for conspiracy in connection with the 1993 World Trade Center bombing.”44
Anwar Haddam, an elected member of the Algerian Parliament, a professor, and
a spokesperson for the Islamic Salvation Front, was arrested in 1996 on the basis of
secret evidence, which supposedly demonstrated his connection to terrorist
organizations.45 Shortly after his arrest, the INS commenced exclusion proceedings
34

Becker, supra note 3, at 615.

35

Spiro, supra note 5, at 708. See also Smothers, supra note 4.

36

Akram & Johnson, supra note 21, at 322.

37

Id. at 321. Between 1992 and 1998, fifty cases involved secret evidence. Smothers,
supra note 4. From 1990 to 2000, secret evidence was used to imprison approximately 100
people. Tim Weiner, Congress Reviewing Use of Evidence Kept Secret, N.Y. TIMES, May 23,
2000, at A19.
38

Weiner, supra note 37.

39

See Akram & Johnson, supra note 21, at 325-26; Saito, Plenary Power, supra note 9 at

19.
40

Saito, Plenary Power, supra note 9, at 19.

41

Id.

42

Id.

43

Id.

44

Id. at 20.

45

Akram & Johnson, supra note 21, at 325; In re Haddam, 2000 BIA LEXIS 20, *7 (Bd.
of Imm. App. 2000).
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against him.46 When the secret evidence was later disclosed, it was found to be
unreliable.47 The appellate judge stated that the evidence was conclusory and
provided an insufficient basis for finding that Haddam was a danger to the United
States or involved with terrorist organizations.48 Haddam was released after four
years of detention.49
In 1997, Mazen al-Najjar was arrested and removal proceedings were initiated
against him on the basis of secret evidence.50 The INS claimed that the thirteen-year
United States resident had overstayed his student visa and constituted a security
threat because he was “connected with terrorism.”51 Al-Najjar was “an editor of the
journal of the World and Islam Studies Enterprise (WISE), a think-tank based at the
University of South Florida devoted to promoting discussion of Middle East
issues.”52 His arrest and detainment were the result of an FBI investigation into the
activities of “a former WISE administrator who became head of the Islamic Jihad.”53
Al-Najjar was held for over three years before the secret evidence that was the basis
of his imprisonment was disclosed during an “open evidence” hearing.54 At this
point it was discovered that the secret evidence, consisting of a video tape that was
said to show that al-Najjar raised funds for Palestinian Islamic Jihad, a terrorist
group, contained no such evidence.55 As a result, the judge ordered the release of alNajjar.56
In Imad Hamad’s case, the INS was determined to prevent Hamad from obtaining
permanent resident status.57 A resident of the United States since 1980, Hamad was
a social worker who was married to a United States citizen.58 In his immigration
court hearings in 1989, the INS displayed photographs from the FBI showing Hamad
“participating in demonstrations and fund-raising events for local Arab-American
groups” and stated that Hamad was a member of the PFLP.59 Proceedings related to
46

In re Haddam, 2000 BIA LEXIS 20 at *7.

47

Akram & Johnson, supra note 21, at 325.

48

In re Haddam, 2000 BIA LEXIS 20 at *112-14.

49

Akram & Johnson, supra note 21, at 325.

50

Id. at 324-25.

51

Anthony Lewis, Abroad at Home; The Uses of Secrecy, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2000, at

A21.
52

Akram & Johnson, supra note 21, at 324-25.

53

Id. at 325.

54

Id. at 324-25. Saito, Plenary Power, supra note 9, at 20.

55

See Lewis, supra note 51.

56

Akram & Johnson, supra note 21, at 325. One source states that “federal officials
offered to release Al-Najjar if people who knew him would inform on others in the
community” and that they were thus “using his incarceration to obtain information
illegitimately.” Saito, Plenary Power, supra note 9, at 20.
57

Smothers, supra note 4.

58

Id.

59

Id.
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the case occurred periodically for the next four years, but Hamad was never
deported.60 Five years later, the INS claimed that it had secret evidence
demonstrating Hamad’s terrorist connections.61 After viewing the evidence,
however, the judge finally granted Hamad permanent residency.62 Later, in 1998, the
INS declassified most of the secret evidence.63 According to Hamad’s lawyer, “[t]he
things they said were secret evidence turned out to be the same declassified stuff we
saw from the F.B.I. back in the 1989 hearing.”64
C. The Secret Evidence Repeal Acts
Media scrutiny of the use of secret evidence and the resulting constitutional
concerns contributed to skepticism by courts, Congress, and the Justice Department
about the necessity and propriety of using secret evidence.65 In 1999, Congress
proposed the first Secret Evidence Repeal Act.66 The Act recommended (1)
repealing the alien terrorist removal provisions of the INA, (2) allowing aliens in
removal proceedings to view all evidence, (3) prohibiting the use of secret evidence
in applications for immigration benefits, defined to include withholding of
deportation or removal or granting of asylum, (4) entitling aliens under arrest and
detention for removal or deportation to government-provided counsel, access to all
evidence, and judicial review, and (5) exempting lawful permanent residents from
security and related removal provisions, which allowed for the use of non-disclosed
information.67 Despite popularity in the House of Representatives and Attorney
General Janet Reno’s support of revision of the rules involving the use of secret
evidence, the Secret Evidence Repeal Act of 1999 was never passed.68
In 2001, Congress proposed a second Secret Evidence Repeal Act.69 If passed,
the Act would have required that aliens in any immigration proceeding in which
classified information would be used receive advance notice of such intention, that
use of classified information be limited to terrorist activity deportation or opposition
of an alien’s admission when such information could not be obtained from open
sources and the government requests declassification, that federal district courts
review classified material upon the request of the Attorney General or the alien, and
that the federal district court issue an order containing an unclassified summary of
60

Id.

61

Id.

62

Id.

63

Id.

64

Id.

65

Spiro, supra note 5, at 708-09; Smothers, supra note 4.

66

Secret Evidence Repeal Act of 1999, H.R. 2121, 106th Cong. § 6 (1999).

67

Id.

68

See Weiner, supra note 37. The INS was opposed to such revisions, stating that limits
on the use of secret evidence “will make us choose either between requesting an agency to
declassify national security information, or going ahead and letting a benefit be granted to an
alien who is a danger to national security.” Id.
69

Secret Evidence Repeal Act of 2001, H.R. 1266, 107th Cong. (2001).
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classified material when possible.70 Further, the Act would have entitled aliens
subject to arrest and detention for removal or deportation to “(1) non-federally
provided counsel; (2) examine all evidence, present evidence, and question
witnesses; (3) have a complete record of the proceeding kept; and (4) judicial
review.”71 Like the Act of 1999, the Secret Evidence Repeal Act of 2001 would also
have exempted lawful permanent residents from security and related removal
provisions.72
While these statutes were being considered, the use of secret evidence continued.
The most well-known case is that of Hany Kiareldeen, a man detained on the basis of
secret evidence that turned out to be not only untruthful but invented by his vengeful
ex-wife.73 In 1998, the INS arrested Kiareldeen, a Palestinian-Israeli citizen74 and
United States resident since 1990, and began proceedings to deport him to Gaza on
the basis of secret evidence.75 A declassified summary of the secret evidence given
to Kiareldeen’s attorney revealed that the evidence consisted of statements of
anonymous informants alleging that Kiareldeen wanted to kill Attorney General
Janet Reno and that he had met with Nidal A. Ayyad, one of the men convicted in
the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center, a week before the attack.76 Kiareldeen
denied every allegation.77 Later, in immigration court, Kiareldeen also demonstrated
numerous weaknesses in the secret evidence and that his accuser was probably his
ex-wife.78 The immigration court released Kiareldeen on bond pending any
government appeal.79 Numerous attempts by the INS to keep Kiareldeen in detention
by staying his release were successful, in part because the INS argued that
Kiareldeen posed a threat to national security; Kiareldeen was finally released in
October of 1999.80
D. The Use of Secret Evidence After September 11
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 have had a tremendous impact on the
priorities of the federal government. Commentators theorize that not only is it
decreasingly likely that a Secret Evidence Repeal Act will be passed,81 but also that

70

Id.

71

Id.

72

Id.

73

Smothers, supra note 4.

74

Kiareldeen, 273 F.3d at 545.

75

Secrecy and Due Process, WASH. POST, Oct. 25, 1999, at A28 [hereinafter Secrecy and
Due Process].
76

Smothers, supra note 4.

77

Id.

78

Secrecy and Due Process, supra note 75.

79

Id.

80

Kiareldeen, 273 F.3d at 546-47.

81

See Akram & Johnson, supra note 21, at 349-50; Saito, American Jurisprudence, supra
note 9, at 38. This is particularly interesting considering that “[d]uring the 2000 Presidential
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measures already enacted since September 11, particularly the Executive Order
issued by President George W. Bush establishing military tribunals, demonstrate that
the government supports the use of secrecy, particularly in cases involving Arabs and
Muslims suspected of terrorism or association with terrorist groups.82
Dicta in Kiareldeen v. Ashcroft demonstrates that the terrorist attacks on
September 11 made courts increasingly willing to support the use of secrecy to
prevent further terrorist attacks. While cautioning that it was only examining
whether the government “was justified in initiating the proceeding and going forward
with the hearing before the immigration judge” and not the underlying merits of the
case, the Third Circuit held that “there was ample substantial justification for the
position adopted by the government.”83 In doing so, the court noted that “[t]he eerie,
if not prescient, information that the Joint Terrorism Task Force assembled from its
sources, must be evaluated in light of ‘the degree of suspicion that attaches to
particular types of [activities,]’” and that particularly in light of the harsh criticism of
the FBI following the September 11th attacks, “[the information contained in the
secret evidence] understandably created apprehension on the part of the Joint
Terrorism Task Force, alerting the government to take all necessary action to
investigate all leads and assure the defense of the nation.”84
In contrast, some commentators caution that “September 11 provides no cause to
retard [the trend of criticizing the use of secret evidence], at least not in the courts.”85
Spiro suggests that a form of in camera review could effectively be utilized to ensure
informed decisions and he characterizes as “alarmist” arguments insisting that the
use of secret evidence is necessary to fight terrorism.”86
Since September 11, 2001, at least three cases have arisen that involve the use of
secret evidence, those of Mohamed Atriss, Harpal Singh, and Zacarias Moussaoui.
In Atriss’s case, the use of secret evidence was disallowed altogether; in Singh’s, the
court has ordered the government to produce the secret evidence; and in Moussaoui’s
case, struggles regarding the use of secret evidence continue.87
Mohamed Atriss is an American citizen who was born in Egypt.88 Atriss has
been “accused of selling phony identification documents to two of the Sept[ember]
11, 2001, hijackers.”89 Although none of the charges in the case specifically refer to
the hijackers, the prosecutors have mentioned Atriss’s connection to them in
campaign, George W. Bush criticized the Clinton administration’s use of secret evidence
proceedings against Arabs and Muslims as tantamount to unlawful racial profiling.” Akram &
Johnson, supra note 21, at 349-50.
82

See infra Part II.

83

Kiareldeen, 273 F.3d at 554-55.

84

Id. at 556-57.

85

Spiro, supra note 5, at 709.

86

Id.

87

Moussaoui’s case will be discussed in Part III, infra.

88

Dale Russakoff, Use of Secret Evidence Rejected: Court Orders New Hearing for
Suspect in Fake ID Case, WASH. POST, Jan. 16, 2003, at A02, available at
http://foi.missouri.edu/secretcourts/useofsecret.html.
89

Id.
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hearings.90 The prosecutors sought to use secret evidence in Atriss’s trial, stating
that secrecy was justified because release of the material would threaten national
security.91 They were allowed to use the evidence in a bail proceeding after the
judge found that it came from a credible witness.92 The appellate court handling the
case, however, held that the prosecutors “lacked adequate basis” to use the secret
evidence and ordered the lower court judge to hold a hearing about the reasons
behind the attempts to use secret evidence.93 The appellate judge also suggested that
federal officials testify at the hearing about the threat posed to national security by
the evidence.94 It appears unlikely that the use of secret evidence will be allowed
because federal officials say that they “believe[] Atriss knew no more about the
hijackers than about hundreds of other illegal immigrants who patronized him.”95
In 1999, Harpal Singh and his wife, Rajwinder Kaur, Indian citizens, sought
asylum in the United States.96 In denying them asylum, the immigration judge stated
that “the pair engaged in terrorist activities related to their effort to establish a
separate Sikh state . . . in India.”97 Because the judge also found that it would be
inappropriate to deport the couple because they would likely suffer torture and
persecution upon their return to India, Singh and Kaur were detained, although Kaur
was later released.98 Although the couple denied participating in terrorism, the
government stated that secret evidence justified their detention.99 In May of 2003,
the Ninth Circuit ordered the government to produce the classified documents that it
claims demonstrate Singh’s connection to terrorist activity.100
II. THE USA PATRIOT ACT AND PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH’S EXECUTIVE
ORDER ESTABLISHING MILITARY TRIBUNALS
The tragic events of September 11, 2001 inspired the passage of two pieces of
legislation, the USA PATRIOT Act and President Bush’s Executive Order
establishing military tribunals. Both laws involve controversial infringements on
constitutional rights, but have been justified by the threat to national security posed
by past and future terrorism.

90

Id.

91

Id.

92

Id.

93

Id.

94

Id.

95

Id.

96

Jessie Mangaliman, ‘Secret Evidence’ Review is Ordered, THE MERCURY NEWS (May
21, 2003), at http://www.bayarea.com/mld/mercurynews/news/5910009.htm.
97

Id.

98

Id.

99

Id.

100

See id.; Singh v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 328 F.3d 1205, 1206 (9th Cir.

2003).
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The Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA PATRIOT Act) was
signed into law on October 26, 2001.101 Although the USA PATRIOT Act was
actually prepared before September 11 and has provisions concerning domestic and
foreign terrorists, the Act is commonly thought to have been designed and
implemented as a specific response to the attacks on September 11.102 According to
one commentator, September 11 provided a rare opportunity for the government to
“enact proposals that previously had been rejected or were found to be
unconstitutional and . . . enlarge their own powers while concomitantly eroding the
civil liberties of law-abiding American citizens.”103
Comprised of over three hundred pages,104 the USA PATRIOT Act includes a
considerable number of provisions regarding the appropriate law enforcement
prevention measures for and response to terrorist activities. Each type has been
criticized as infringing on the constitutional rights of suspected terrorists. For
instance, one major component of the USA PATRIOT Act is its authorization of
information-sharing between law enforcement and intelligence agencies.105
Although such practices have previously led to abuses and infringements on the
privacy of American citizens,106 the failure of the government to prevent the events
of September 11 despite the detection by several federal agencies of increasingly
suspicious activities by known associates of terrorists motivated the current demand
for information-sharing.107 That such information-sharing is now sanctioned by the
federal government creates “the specter of intelligence agencies, once again,
collecting, profiling, and potentially harassing U.S. persons engaged in lawful, First
Amendment-protected activities.”108
Additionally, government agencies now have significantly increased informationgathering power. Before passage of the USA PATRIOT Act, in order to use
evidence against a “foreign power” collected from electronic surveillance in a
criminal trial, the primary purpose of the investigation had to have been the

101

Becker, supra note 3, at 592.

102

Id. at 592-93.

103

Id. at 592.

104

John W. Whitehead & Steven H. Aden, Forfeiting “Enduring Freedom” for
“Homeland Security”: A Constitutional Analysis of the USA PATRIOT Act and the Justice
Department’s Anti-Terrorism Initiatives, 51 AM. U. L. REV. 1081, 1088 (2002).
105

See USA PATRIOT Act § 203(d)(1), 115 Stat. 272, 281 (2001); Becker, supra note 3.

106

Becker, supra note 3, at 596.

107

For information on the investigations of various FBI offices, see The FBI’s Handling of
the Phoenix Electronic Communication and Investigation of Zacarias Moussaoui Prior to
September 11, 2001: Hearing Before the Joint Comm. on Intelligence, 107th Cong. 1-15, 24
(2002) (statement of Eleanor Hill, Staff Director, Joint Intelligence Inquiry Staff), available
at http://intelligence.senate.gov/0210hrg/021017/hillunclass.pdf [hereinafter Intelligence
Committee Statement].
108

Becker, supra note 3, at 597 (quoting John Podesta, USA Patriot Act: The Good, the
Bad, and the Sunset, 29 HUM. RTS. 3, 3 (2002)).
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gathering of foreign intelligence, and not investigating crimes.109 This rule was
designed to insure that such searches and seizures only proceed after probable cause
has been established.110 Section 218 of the USA PATRIOT Act, however, only
requires that a significant purpose of an investigation be the gathering of foreign
intelligence in order to allow the use of wiretap evidence, thus potentially allowing
investigators to evade the probable cause requirement.111 Critics caution that the
combined result of the intelligence-sharing and intelligence-gathering provisions
could be the chilling of speech of those involved in political, religious, or
humanitarian efforts.112
Other provisions that increase the evidence-gathering powers of the government
and infringe on Fourth Amendment rights include section 213, which authorizes
delayed notice of searches if “immediate notification . . . may have an adverse
result,”113 section 216, which gives the government significantly increased power to
monitor one’s computer activity,114 section 206, which permits the use of “roving
wiretaps” that effectively monitor a person rather than a particular device,115 and
section 203(a)(1), which dramatically increases the ability of federal prosecutors to
obtain information from grand jury witnesses about a variety of subjects and report it
to numerous other federal agencies.116 Additionally, when the Attorney General
certifies a non-citizen as a suspected terrorist, under the authority of section 412, the
INS may indefinitely detain that person.117 Such practices violate the immigrant’s
due process rights118 and are particularly disconcerting when the Attorney General’s
conclusions are based on secret evidence.119
The use of secret evidence is also specifically advocated by the USA PATRIOT
Act. Section 106 increases the President’s power to seize the property of any foreign
person, organization, or country that has “planned, authorized, aided, or engaged in
such hostilities or attacks against the United States.”120 Although property owners
109

Id. at 598.

110

Id.

111

See USA PATRIOT Act § 218, 115 Stat. at 291; Becker, supra note 3, at 598-99.

112

Becker, supra note 3, at 601.

113

USA PATRIOT Act § 213, 115 Stat. at 285-86.

114

USA PATRIOT Act § 216(b)(1), (c), 115 Stat. at 288-90.

115

USA PATRIOT Act § 206, 115 Stat. at 282.

116

See USA PATRIOT Act § 203(a)(1), 115 Stat. at 278-79; see also Becker, supra note 3,
at 607-08; Akram & Johnson, supra note 21, at 328 (noting that the USA PATRIOT ACT has
“bolstered federal law enforcement surveillance powers over citizens and noncitizens
associated with ‘terrorism’”).
117

See USA PATRIOT Act § 412(a), 115 Stat. at 350-51; Becker, supra note 3, at 609.

118

Becker, supra note 3, at 609-10; Whitehead & Aden, supra note 104, at 1094-95.

119

See Whitehead & Aden, supra note 104, at 1095 (noting that “the lack of concern for
the rights of non-citizens runs thematically through the Administration’s response to the
terrorist attacks”).
120

See USA PATRIOT Act § 106, 115 Stat. at 278; Whitehead & Aden, supra note 104, at

1127.
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may be able to appeal such a seizure under section 316 by claiming that the property
was not an asset of suspected terrorists, section 316 also allows the government to
use secret evidence in such a proceeding if revealing the evidence could compromise
national security.121
In addition, the USA PATRIOT Act both centralizes law enforcement authority
in the Department of Justice and increases the scope of individuals under scrutiny for
terrorist activities.122 In fact, “[t]he extent to which the[] executive branch powers
have been consolidated in one official, the Attorney General, is unprecedented in
recent history.”123 The USA PATRIOT Act is focused only on the activity of
terrorists, but the Act redefines “domestic terrorism” to include a considerably
broader range of threatening activities than ever before.124 Such wide-sweeping
provisions create the possibility that the government will selectively target political
groups with interests and priorities contrary to its own, groups that would not have
been considered terrorist groups in previous years. Focusing such broad powers in
one person, the Attorney General, creates a tremendous potential for abuse.
Less than a month after the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act, President Bush
issued an Executive Order, which enabled government lawyers to try non-citizens
suspected of terrorism or harboring terrorists in military courts in which those
defendants would have very few rights.125 In addition to infringing on the Sixth
Amendment’s guarantee of a jury trial by dictating that trials would be held in front
of a panel of military officers,126 the Order explicitly stated that the tribunals would
not utilize “the principles of law or the rules of evidence” that are normally required
in criminal trials because of the threat posed by international terrorism.127 This
meant that defendants in military tribunals are not entitled to the presumption of
innocence and their guilt does not have to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt in
121

See USA PATRIOT Act § 316, 115 Stat. at 309; Whitehead & Aden, supra note 104, at

1129.
122

See Whitehead & Aden, supra note 104, at 1088-93.

123

Id. at 1089.

124

See USA PATRIOT Act § 802, 115 Stat. at 376; Whitehead & Aden, supra note 104, at

1189.
125
See Military Order of Nov. 11, 2001, Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain NonCitizens in the War Against Terror, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 13, 2001). See also Akram &
Johnson, supra note 21, at 328; Becker, supra note 3, at 581.
126

Edward Alden, National Security vs. Due Process, FIN. TIMES, July 15, 2003, available
at http://www.derechos.org/nizkor/excep/alden.html. Also, according to Becker, “[n]either the
Constitution nor any federal statute permits the President to create a military court with the
jurisdiction to try all cases of alleged international terrorism against the United States” and the
Military Order violates the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Becker,
supra note 3, at 583-85. Additionally, Becker argues that the two cases cited as precedent for
the legality of the military tribunals are inapposite because in those cases the tribunals were
established after a formal declaration of war, whereas Congress did not declare war after the
events of September 11. Id. at 587-91. Thus, the legality of military tribunals is suspect to
begin with.
127

Whitehead & Aden, supra note 104, at 1118-19 (citing Military Order of Nov. 11, 2001,
66 Fed. Reg. at 57,833).
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order to be convicted.128 Further, the Order stated that all evidence with “probative
value to a reasonable person” could be utilized, but evidence that, if revealed, would
threaten national security could be kept secret.129 Additionally, military tribunals
were authorized to impose the death penalty with only a two-third majority vote in
support.130
On March 21, 2002, however, the rules of trials in military tribunals were
modified somewhat. The latest version of the rules requires that defendants be
provided court-appointed military lawyers if they do not retain private counsel, that
journalists be allowed to observe trials, that proceedings be closed when classified
material is being discussed, that defendants be presumed innocent, that in order to
convict the tribunal must find there to have been proof beyond a reasonable doubt by
a two-thirds vote, that there be a unanimous verdict in order to impose the death
penalty, and that appeals be heard by “panels of military and/or civilian specialists,”
among other provisions.131 In practice, however, these alterations may not make a
substantial difference because section 7(B) of the Department of Defense’s Military
Commission Order states that, “[i]n the event of any inconsistency between the
President’s Military Order and this Order, including any supplementary regulations
or instructions issued under Section 7(A), the provisions of the President’s Military
Order shall govern.”132
Additionally, although defendants will be entitled to counsel, “defense attorneys
are likely to be selected or scrutinized by the government because much of the
evidence against their client will be classified information.”133 Also, the judges in
such tribunals will be military officers who are probably very conscious of and
concerned about national security interests.134 “Suspects tried under this Order will
be under the exclusive jurisdiction of the military tribunals,” and thus they will not
be entitled to any appeals other than the Secretary of Defense or President’s review
of the military tribunal’s final decision.135 “[T]he Order provides the President . . .
with the greatest array of legal powers to be exercised in the justice system that has
ever been vested in a single person, office, or branch of government since the birth of
this nation.”136
Although it is frequently argued that terrorism offenses are not significantly
different from other criminal infractions and thus should also be tried in ordinary

128

Becker, supra note 3, at 582.

129

See Whitehead & Aden, supra note 104, at 1119; Becker, supra note 3, at 582, 613.

130

Whitehead & Aden, supra note 104, at 1119.

131

Becker, supra note 3, at 585-86.

132

Id. at 586. Department of Defense Military Commission Order No. 1, § 7(A), (B) (Mar.
21, 2002), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2002/d20020321ord.pdf.
133
Emanuel Gross, Trying Terrorists – Justification for Differing Trial Rules: The Balance
Between Security Considerations and Human Rights, 13 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 51
(2002).
134

Id. at 69.

135

Whitehead & Aden, supra note 104, at 1119; see also Gross, supra note 133, at 51.

136

Becker, supra note 3, at 581.
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criminal courts,137 supporters of military tribunals argue that terrorists are war
criminals and therefore should be tried in military tribunals.138 Additionally, trials in
civilian courts may give terrorists a forum from which they can spread their views,
continue to inspire fear, and perhaps even communicate with comrades.139
III. SECRET EVIDENCE IN THE ZACARIAS MOUSSAOUI CASE
Although the use of secret evidence was controversial before September 11,140
recently, the Zacarias Moussaoui case has brought it back into the headlines. The
case is a powerful illustration of the additional policy concerns that have arisen since
September 11 and the issuance of Bush’s Executive Order.
Soon after September 11, 2001, newspapers began to announce that the “20th
hijacker” had been identified. Moussaoui, a French citizen of Moroccan descent,
was already in the custody of the INS awaiting deportation when the attacks on
September 11 occurred.141 He had attracted the attention of the FBI because of
strange behavior exhibited during flight school training.142 In February of 2001,
Moussaoui began to take flight lessons in a small Cessna plane.143 By May he had
grown tired of these lessons and contacted Pan American International Flight School
to learn how to fly a Boeing 747, a considerably larger plane.144
Because most students learning to fly Boeing 747s have pilots’ licenses, work for
an airline, and have accumulated “several thousand flight hours” and Moussaoui had
none of these attributes, he attracted the attention of his instructors.145 In August of
2001, one of the flight instructors contacted the Minneapolis branch of the FBI.146
The FBI office began an “international terrorism investigation of Moussaoui”

137
See, e.g., Gross, supra note 133, at 69 (stating that “[i]t follows that the entire process
remains within a special military system; whereas, the offense itself is no different from any
other criminal offense tried within the civilian framework”); Spiro, supra note 5, at 665
(arguing that “[t]errorism . . . ultimately reduces to a kind of criminal activity, which can be
addressed as such”); Becker, supra note 3, at 614 (“Our system of criminal justice, with due
process for all, is fully capable of dealing with all types of criminal violations.”).
138

Gross, supra note 133, at 58.

139

Id. at 61-62. It has also been suggested that neither civilian courts nor military tribunals
are appropriate to try such cases and that instead a federal terrorist court may be a better
option. This suggestion is aimed in particular at solving the problems involved with secret
evidence. “Such a court could craft procedures that would allow for the administration of
secret evidence without exposing the sources and methods employed by U.S. intelligence.”
Harvey Rishikof, Is It Time for a Federal Terrorist Court? Terrorists and Prosecutions:
Problems, Paradigms, and Paradoxes, 8 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADV. 1, 5 (2003).
140

Spiro, supra note 5, at 704.

141

See Intelligence Committee Statement, supra note 107, at 15, 22.
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Id. at 16-18.
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Id. at 16.
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Id. at 16-17.
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Id.
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Id. at 17.
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because they believed Moussaoui was a national security threat.147 By the time of the
investigation, Moussaoui was illegally remaining in the United States, as he had
entered using his French passport, which allowed him to stay in the country without
a visa until May 22, 2001, ninety days after his arrival.148
Moussaoui continued to exhibit bizarre behavior, including displaying an unusual
interest in “the operation of the plane’s doors and control panel.”149 Moussaoui also
stated that he would “‘love’ to fly a simulated flight from Heathrow Airport in
England to John F. Kennedy Airport in New York.”150 After determining that it
would be dangerous to allow Moussaoui to complete any more flying lessons, FBI
agents temporarily detained Moussaoui, and then took him into custody after
discovering that he was in the United States illegally.151 When Moussaoui showed
the FBI agents his passport case, they saw that he had a bank statement for an
account in Oklahoma in which $32,000 had been deposited in cash.152 Moussaoui
was unable to explain the details surrounding the deposit.153
Moussaoui’s activity aroused the suspicions of numerous government agents.154
In particular, Moussaoui’s desire to fly a simulated England-to-New York flight
made one CIA officer suspect that he may be a hijacker, only furthering concerns
resulting from Moussaoui’s earlier denial that he was a Muslim while a companion
of Moussaoui’s had told the FBI that Moussaoui was a fundamentalist.155
By the end of August, the FBI determined that there was “insufficient
information to show that Moussaoui was an agent of any foreign power.”156 The FBI
began to arrange for Moussaoui to be deported to France in mid-September.157 Then,
the attacks of September 11 occurred.
After that day, the FBI’s investigation of Moussaoui continued and on December
11, 2001, exactly three months after the attacks, Moussaoui was indicted on one
charge each of conspiracy to commit acts of terrorism transcending national
boundaries, conspiracy to commit aircraft piracy, conspiracy to destroy aircraft,
conspiracy to use weapons of mass destruction, conspiracy to murder United States
employees, and conspiracy to destroy United States property.158 That day, at a news
conference, Attorney General Ashcroft stated that “[t]he first indictment ha[d] been
147

Id.

148

Id. at 16-17.

149

Id. at 17.

150

Id.

151

Id. at 17-18.
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Id. at 18.

153

Id.
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See id. at 19-20.
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Id. at 20.
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Id. at 22.
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Id.

158

See Indictment of Zacarias Moussaoui, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/moussaoui
indictment.htm [hereinafter Indictment of Zacarias Moussaoui].

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol52/iss4/6

16

2004-05] USE OF SECRET EVIDENCE BY GOVERNMENT LAWYERS

587

brought against the terrorists of September 11th.”159 Ashcroft described the
indictment as charging Moussaoui with “undergoing the same training, receiving the
same funding, and pledging the same commitment to kill Americans as the
hijackers.”160 The indictment also alleged that Ramzi Binalshibh funded the efforts
of Moussaoui and others from Germany.161 The government stated that it would seek
the death penalty for Moussaoui.162
The Moussaoui case has been unpredictable and complicated from the beginning.
On January 3, 2002, when Moussaoui was arraigned, he “refused ‘in the name of
Allah’ to enter a plea.”163 The judge entered a not guilty plea for Moussaoui.164
Throughout the case, Moussaoui has continually criticized both his counsel and the
judge.165 On April 22, 2002, Moussaoui told the court that he wanted to represent
himself.166 After Judge Leonie Brinkema warned Moussaoui that by acting as his
own attorney he would not have access to the classified material that would be used
against him, Moussaoui stated that he understood the consequences of selfrepresentation and Brinkema determined that he could represent himself with the
assistance of co-counsel.167 Though Moussaoui has made numerous motions to
dismiss his co-counsel, Brinkema has denied them due to Moussaoui’s demonstrated
lack of understanding of the American legal system, the complexity of the charges,
the large amount of secret evidence to which Moussaoui does not have access, the
fact that the government is seeking the death penalty, and the “strict conditions of
[his] confinement.”168
In August of 2002, Moussaoui filed a motion “to get access to so-called secret
evidence” in which he requested a copy of the videotape in which Osama bin Laden
159

News Conference Regarding Zacarias Moussaoui, DOJ Conference Center (Dec. 11,
2001), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/speeches/2001/agcrisisremarks12_11.htm
[hereinafter News Conference].
160

Id.

161

See Indictment of Zacarias Moussaoui, supra note 158.

162
News Conference, supra note 159; Phil Hirschkorn, Judge Denies Moussaoui Request
for Help from Muslim Attorney, at http://www.cnn.com/2002/LAW/07/12/moussaoui.trial/
index.html (July 12, 2002).
163
Michael J. Kelly, Executive Excess v. Judicial Process: American Judicial Responses to
The Government’s War on Terror, 13 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 787, 793 (2003).
164

Id.

165

Id.

166

Viveca Novak, How the Moussaoui Case Crumbled, TIME, Oct. 19, 2003, available at
http://foi.missouri.edu/secretcourts/moussaouicase.html.
167

Id.

168

Hirschkorn, supra note 162, at http://www.cnn.com/2002/LAW/07/12/moussaoui.trial/
index.html. Moussaoui is being held in solitary confinement. Warren Richey, In Terror Case,
Security Trumps Legal Rights, THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Aug. 7, 2002, available at
http://www.csmonitor.com/2002/0807/p02s02-usju.html. Moussaoui is kept in his cell for
twenty-two hours a day and can only have contact with his attorneys and his immediate
family.
Phil Hirschkorn, Moussaoui Talks to ‘Standby’ Lawyers, available at
http://www.cnn.com/2002/LAW/08/03/attacks.moussaoui/index.html (Aug. 3, 2002).
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discusses the attacks on September 11.169 Brinkema denied the motion stating that
“the defendant’s repeated prayers for the destruction of the United States and the
American people, admission to being a member of al Qaeda, and pledged allegiance
to Osama bin Laden are strong evidence that the national security could be
threatened if the defendant had access to classified information.”170 The judge
further stated that “the United States’ interest in protecting its national security
information outweighs the defendant’s desire to review the classified discovery” and
that Moussaoui’s “Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights are adequately protected by
standby counsel’s review of the classified discovery and their participation in any
proceedings . . . .”171 The judge also noted that the government was in the process of
declassifying some of its information to which Moussaoui would then have access.172
Moussaoui’s case was delayed once until January of 2003 and then again until
March of 2003, the first time because of the time required for Moussaoui to review
the large volume of evidence to be used by the government at trial and the second
time because the FBI accidentally left classified documents in Moussaoui’s cell after
questioning him.173 On January 30, 2003, the judge held a secret hearing, from
which even Moussaoui was barred, during which the prosecutors explained their
theory of the case.174 Rather than believing that Moussaoui was the “twentieth
hijacker,” prosecutors stated that they would seek to prove that Moussaoui intended
to hijack and fly a fifth plane into the White House.175 Although Moussaoui’s
standby counsel was allowed to attend the hearing, because Moussaoui does not have
national security clearance, they could not discuss with him the classified evidence
mentioned at the hearing.176 In April of 2003, however, Brinkema ruled that the
government must release some portions of the classified transcript of the hearing to
Moussaoui so that he can know the government’s theory of the case and prepare his
defense.177
Although defendants are not ordinarily entitled to know the
169

Richey, supra note 168, at http://www.csmonitor.com/2002/0807/p02s02-usju.html.

170

Order at 2, United States v. Zacarias Moussaoui, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2017 (E.D. Va.
2003) (No. 01-455-A), available at http://news.findlaw.com/cnn/docs/terrorism/usmouss
82302ord.pdf.
171

Id.

172

Id. at 3.

173

Tom Jackman, Moussaoui Received Classified Documents: U.S. Agents Searched Jail
Cell After Prosecutors Turned Over Papers by Mistake, WASH. POST, Sept. 27, 2002, at A09,
available at http://foi.missouri.edu/secretcourts/moussaoui.html. A different source states that
the trial was postponed until June rather than March so that each side would have adequate
time to prepare. Jerry Markon, Moussaoui Trial Postponed for Third Time: No New Date Set
Pending Outcome of Government’s Appeal, WASH. POST, Feb. 13, 2003, at A08, available at
http://foi.missouri.edu/secretcourts/moussaouitrial.html.
174

Toni Locy, Moussaoui Case Prosecutors Have Fifth-Plane Theory, USA TODAY, Apr.
25, 2003, available at http://foi.missouri.edu/secretcourts/moussaoui2.html.
175

Id.

176

Id.

177

Phil Hirschkorn, U.S. Must Supply 9/11 Suspect With Details on New Theory, Judge
Rules, available at http://www.cnn.com/2003/LAW/04/29/moussaoui/ (Apr. 29, 2003).
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government’s theory of the case before trial, Brinkema stated that because
Moussaoui’s counsel already heard the theory in the hearing, Moussaoui is also
entitled to know what it is.178
At the same hearing, Judge Brinkema ruled that Moussaoui could question
Binalshibh in a videotaped deposition; Binalshibh had been captured by the United
States.179 Moussaoui claims that Binalshibh can help him prove that, although he is a
member of al Qaeda, he was not involved with the attacks on September 11.180 The
Justice Department appealed the decision to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals,
stating that permitting Moussaoui to question Binalshibh would cause “‘immediate
and irreparable’ harm to national security and would imperil the prosecution of other
major terror suspects.”181 Assistant Attorney General Michael Chertoff argued that
Moussaoui does not have a constitutional right to question enemy combatants being
held overseas, despite the fact that they may have information that could aid in his
defense.182 Moussaoui’s defense counsel stated that Ashcroft had filed a secret
affidavit in which he stated that he would not make Binalshibh available to the
defense and that the government should be penalized for this decision.183
A three-judge panel of the Fourth Circuit “reject[ed] the government’s appeal,”
ruling that the lower court’s order had not reached an appropriate stage for review.184
The court stated that if the Justice Department refused to allow Moussaoui to
interview Binalshibh and the trial court sanctioned the government, the Fourth
Circuit could then intervene in the trial and suggest that the prosecution and defense
attempt to find an alternative solution.185 The government, refusing to consider
alternatives, stated that it would ask the three-judge panel to reverse its ruling and
178

Id.

179

Locy, supra note 174, at http://foi.missouri.edu/secretcourts/moussaoui2.html.

180

Philip Shenon, Justice Dept. Warns of Risk to Prosecution and Security, N.Y. TIMES,
June 3, 2003, available at http://foi.missouri.edu/secretcourts/justicedept.html. “Binalshibh
had reportedly told investigators that Moussaoui was considered too unreliable for the 9/11
attacks, did not know about them and was to be used only if absolutely necessary.” Novak,
supra note 166. Moussaoui would also like to question captured al Qaeda members Khalid
Shaikh Mohammed, Mohamed al-Hawsawi, and Abu Zubaydah, who he claims will say that
he was not involved in the September 11 attacks. Phil Hirschkorn & Terry Frieden, Doubt
Cast on Moussaoui Trial: Judge Laments Government’s ‘Shroud of Secrecy’, available at
http://foi.missouri.edu/secretcourts/doubtcast.html (Apr. 5, 2003).
Mohammed “told
investigators that Moussaoui was to be used for a separate attack unrelated to 9/11.” Novak,
supra note 166.
181

Shenon, supra note 180.

182

Id.

183

Id.

184

Neil A. Lewis, Bush Officials Lose Round in Prosecuting Terror Suspect, N.Y. TIMES,
June 27, 2003, available at http://foi.missouri.edu/secretcourts/bushofficials.html.
185
Id. See Jerry Markon, Court Seeks Deal on Terror Witness Access, WASH. POST, Apr.
16, 2003, at A12. The appellate court stated that if the government offered substitutions, the
district court would have to determine whether a substitution would “provide the defendant
with substantially the same ability to make his defense as would” access to Binalshibh. United
States v. Moussaoui, No. 03-4162, 2003 WL 1889018, *1 (4th Cir. 2003).
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that it was also considering appealing to the full Fourth Circuit, contending that “the
government should not be forced to suffer a sanction for refusing to permit a
deposition that will endanger national security before obtaining appellate review of
the district court’s order.”186
Despite repeated statements by the Justice Department that it is confident that the
case can proceed in civilian courts,187 the government also stated that it would
consider transferring Mouussaoui’s case to a military tribunal in order to avoid the
consequences of Brinkema’s decision.188 Brinkema herself expressed doubt that the
case could be fully adjudicated in civilian court due to the large amount of secret
evidence in the case.189 Judge Brinkema has stated that she is “‘disturbed by the
extent to which the United States’ intelligence officials have classified the pleadings,
orders and memorandum opinions in this case.”190
The Justice Department continued to refuse to allow Moussaoui access to
Binalshibh,191 stating that permitting such questioning “would needlessly jeopardize
national security at a time of war with an enemy who has already murdered
thousands of our citizens.”192 In response, Judge Brinkema ruled that the
government could not seek the death penalty or “present evidence that Moussaoui
was involved in the [September 11] attacks.”193 The government appealed the
decision to the Fourth Circuit.194 The Fourth Circuit affirmed Judge Brinkema’s
order to produce Binalshibh195 and rejected the government’s suggestion that
Moussaoui only be provided summaries of Binalshibh’s statements.196 The Fourth
Circuit determined that an alternative solution could be reached, however, and

186

Associated Press, Prosecutors Will Try Again for Ruling on Moussaoui, July 2, 2003,
available at http://foi.missouri.edu/secretcourts/prosecutors.html.
187
See, e.g., Hirschkorn & Frieden, supra note 180; Greg Gordon, Judge Concerned About
Secrecy in Moussaoui Case, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis, Minn.), Apr. 5, 2003, available at
http://foi.missouri.edu/secretcourts/judgeconcerned.html; Josh White, Memos Reveal Doubt on
Proper Court for Moussaoui, WASH. POST, June 3, 2003, at A08, available at
http://foi.missouri.edu/secretcourts/ memosreveal.html.
188

The Trial of Zacarias Moussaoui, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 2003, available at
http://foi.missouri.edu/secretcourts/trialzacarias.html.
189
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removed the sanctions against the government.197 The Fourth Circuit stated that “no
punitive sanction is warranted here because the Government has rightfully exercised
its prerogative to protect national security interests by refusing to produce the
witnesses.”198
IV. CONCLUSION: THE USE OF SECRET EVIDENCE AFTER SEPTEMBER 11:
DUE PROCESS VS. NATIONAL SECURITY CONCERNS
The current controversies in the Moussaoui case reveal that in addition to the
concerns involved with the use of secret evidence before September 11, the events of
September 11 and the resulting legislation created considerable additional policy
issues.
Before September 11, concern was widespread about the substantive content of
the material being kept secret. In numerous cases in which classified evidence that
the government cited as the basis for indictment and conviction has been revealed,
the evidence has not provided a sufficient basis for detention.199 The potential for
related abuse of such evidence is especially worrisome in the post-September 11 era
because of the possibility of the widespread use of secret evidence in military
tribunals in which defendants have even fewer rights than in civilian courts.200
Additionally, there is evidence that secret evidence has been used only in cases
concerning certain groups, in particular, Arabs and Muslims.201 Apart from the
problems inherent in racial-profiling in any application of criminal law,
discriminatory use of secret evidence also threatens to chill the political speech of
Arabs and Muslims.202
The Moussaoui case demonstrates that national security concerns are of the
utmost priority to the federal government and that, in some cases, they can trump
concerns about a defendant’s individual liberties. The case also shows that although
both the judges and the government lawyers involved attempt to resolve the priorities
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of national security and constitutional rights, often the parties come to differing
conclusions about the appropriate course of the case. Bush’s Executive Order gives
the government lawyer considerable power in this situation. Because prosecutors
can threaten to drop a case and bring it in a military tribunal where defendants’
constitutional rights are even less protected, judges may resolve some motions in the
government’s favor simply to give the defendant the greatest protection of his rights.
By tailoring decisions to the specific facts of cases and avoiding complete dismissal
where possible, judges encourage government lawyers to keep their cases in civilian
courts. The ability of government lawyers to bring their cases in military tribunals in
the first place, however, does give the prosecution significant influence over the
balance between national security concerns and defendants’ rights.
The events of recent years, including the attacks of September 11, combat in Iraq,
and frequent terror alerts, demonstrate that concern about national security is
strongly justified. The visibility and emotional impact of these issues, though, does
not decrease the additional threat imposed by curtailment of defendants’ rights. The
ability of the government lawyer to utilize secret evidence both furthers the justice
done in cases involving national security and threatens to set a dangerous precedent
allowing the restriction of defendants’ rights when priorities are deemed important
enough.
In order to preserve the integrity of our criminal justice system, government
lawyers should bring terrorism cases in civilian courts to the extent that they can do
so without threatening important cases that involve significant substantive secret
evidence. Numerous critics caution that we must remain aware of the long-term
consequences of the current use of secret evidence and military tribunals.203 A
reconsideration of the Secret Evidence Repeal Acts after the trials of those connected
to the September 11 attacks would be well advised. Because Bush’s Executive
Order gives government lawyers significant power and discretion, it is imperative
that secret evidence be used only when necessary and only when the secret evidence
effectively proves elements of a crime in order for the government to maintain
integrity and the country’s trust in these important prosecutions.
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